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Care.Data proposes to link individual-level hospital episode statistics (HES) and general 
practice data at the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). As is currently the 
case for HES, linked data will be pseudoanonymised before being released to researchers.1 A 
proposed alternative is for identifiers (e.g. NHS number, date of birth) to be 
pseudoanonymised at source 2using an encrypted hash, before linkage is performed.3 4 
Pseudoanonymisation at source will increase data linkage errors, where two records 
belonging to the same patient fail to link (missed match) or two records are incorrectly 
assigned to the same patient (false match). Duplicate records and ‘confusions’ (two patients 
sharing a record) frequently occur in clinical settings (e.g. due to recent changes of name or 
address, typographical errors).  
Data linkage errors have clinical implications, but are also relevant to commissioning and 
research. False matches lead to over-estimation of prevalence (e.g. if cases are counted 
twice). Missed matches lead to under-estimation of prevalence (e.g. if cases are missed) and 
loss of statistical power. When healthier subgroups of the population are more likely to link 
correctly than others, biased estimates of relative risk can occur. Linkage errors lower the 
quality of information available and can lead to flawed decision making.  
Records that can be linked are restricted to those with complete identifiers required by the 
linkage algorithm. The number of these records that are correctly linked will always be 
lower. For example, an NHS number might be present and valid,3 yet incorrect. 
Pseudoanonymisation will prevent techniques that overcome identifier errors, such as 
partial matching on date of birth,1 and feedback to providers to prevent it. And if we want 
to plan for better integration of services across health and social care,5 we should make best 
use of patient identifiers – not scramble them and ignore any errors. 
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